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JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2-2(3)0) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Whether the trial court properly granted Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Lack 
of Personal Jurisdiction. 
Standard of Review: An appeal from a pretrial jurisdictional decision presents only 
legal questions that are reviewed for correctness. Arguello v. Industrial Woodworking 
Machine Co., 838 P.2d 1120, 1121 (Utah 1992). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-24 (Supp. 1999) provides in pertinent part: 
Any person, notwithstanding Section 16-10a-1501, whether or not a 
citizen or resident of this state, who in person or through an agent does any 
of the following enumerated acts, submits himself... to the jurisdiction of 
the courts of this state as to any claim arising from or related to: 
(1) the transaction of any business within this state; 
(2) contracting to supply services or goods in this state; 
(3) the causing of any injury within this state whether tortious or by breach 
of warranty; 
(4) the ownership, use, or possession of any real estate situated in this state . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case. Plaintiff ("Ho") sued Jim's Enterprises, Inc., a Nevada 
corporation, which does business as the Silver Smith Casino Resort in Wendover, Nevada 
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("Silver Smith"). She claims she was injured when a Silver Smith employee struck her in 
the back with a serving tray as she was waiting for a place to play at one of the gaming 
tables. Hofs complaint sounds in negligence. Record at 1-7. 
Course of Proceedings Below. Silver Smith did not answer Hofs complaint, but 
filed its Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction and a memorandum in 
support which included the Affidavit of Linda Sweat, the Executive Director of 
Administration of the Silver Smith. Record at 12-25. After the motion was fully briefed, 
the court entered a minute entry, granting it. Record at 76-77. 
During the pendency of the Motion to Dismiss, Ho submitted interrogatories and 
requests for production of documents to the Silver Smith. Record at 26. Silver Smith 
responded to interrogatories 8 and 9, the only interrogatories which sought jurisdictional 
facts. Record at 71-75. 
After the trial court entered its minute entry granting the motion to dismiss, Ho 
filed a Motion to Reconsider, accompanied by a Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff s 
Motion to Reconsider, Request for Oral Argument, Leave on Discoveries. Record at 79-
115. After being fully briefed, the court denied the motion to reconsider. Record at 168-
169, 170-71. It was not until after the Motion to Reconsider was decided that the court 
entered the Order of Dismissal. Record at 172-73. 
Statement of Facts. 
1. Jim's Enterprises, Inc. is a Nevada corporation which operates the Silver 
Smith Casino Resort in Wendover, Nevada. Record at 19. 
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2. On September 29, 1998, while waiting for a gaming table at Silver Smith's 
casino in Wendover, Nevada, Ho was struck by a serving tray held by a Silver Smith 
employee. She claims she was injured as a result. Record at 1-7. 
3. Silver Smith advertises the hotel and casino in Utah and other states. 
Record at 1,2, 19,72. 
4. Silver Smith purchases some supplies and services from merchants in Utah, 
Nevada and other states. Record at 19. 
7. Silver Smith leases some real property in Utah for parking lot and storage 
facilities. Record at 19, 73; see also record at 1, 2. 
9. Silver Smith does not own any real property in Utah, is not registered to do 
business within the State of Utah and does not offer for sale in Utah any goods or 
services. Record at 19, 73. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
I. The activities of the Silver Smith are not substantial and continuous and 
tantamount to doing business in Utah. The business of the Silver Smith is operating a 
hotel and casino in Nevada. In carrying out this business, it buys some goods and 
services from merchants in Utah, Nevada and other states, advertises in Utah and other 
states and leases property in Utah for storage and parking lot purposes. It does not offer 
goods or services for sale in Utah, is not registered to do business in Utah and does not 
own any real property in Utah. 
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This is the sole evidence properly before the lower court. Improperly, Ho attached 
to her brief discovery from other cases, information from the Internet, advertising and 
telephone book listings, State of Nevada filings concerning Jim's Enterprises, Inc., copies 
of old stationery of State Line Properties, Ltd. (a Utah limited partnership) and insurance 
policy pages from another case. See attachments A-G, I-K of appellant's brief. None of 
these items was submitted to the trial court and should not be considered by this Court. 
The activities of the Silver Smith in Utah are not as extensive as those of the State 
Line in Buddensick v. Stateline Hotel Inc., 972 P.2d 928 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) cert, 
denied, 982 P.2d 88 (Utah 1999), cert denied, 145 L.Ed. 2d 253, 120 S.Ct. 324 (1999). In 
Buddensick, the Court of Appeals held that the State Line's activities in Utah were 
substantial and continuous based on its extensive advertising and promotional activities in 
Utah including maintaining a toll-free telephone number, its leasing five parcels of 
property in Utah, two of which were for parking lot and signage purposes, contracting for 
goods and services with Utah corporations (food, linens, advertisements and professional 
services), maintaining two post office boxes in Utah, two telephone numbers, and six fax 
numbers in Utah. Id. at 931. By contrast, the evidence before the lower court in this case 
was that the Silver Smith advertised in Utah, purchased some goods and services from 
Utah merchants, and was a lessee under a lease of property for parking lot and storage 
purposes. 
A state's power to exercise general personal jurisdiction is limited by the Due 
Process Clause. The Silver Smith's activities in Utah are not as extensive as the 
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defendant s in Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co,, 342 U.S. 437, 96 L.Ed. 485, 
72 S.Ct. 413 (1952), in which the United States Supreme Court held there was general 
jurisdiction, or even the defendant in Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, s I • ;/.-, 
466U.S. 408, 80L.Ed. 204, KMSCl. ISO'S ( M)8M, m wlm/li Ihe -,-•- •;. • ""3 
defendant' s contacts in the foi i in I w ere insufficient to confer general jurisdiction. 
II. Unquestionably, Ho's injuries did not arise out of nor are they related to Silver 
Smith's (1) entering into transactions in Utah or (2) owning, using or possessing real 
property in Utah. The injury was not caused in Utah nor did Silver Smith offer good 
services for sale in I Jtal i Ilii is, there is no specific pei soi lal jur isdiction o\ ei t;f^  NI?<. -
Smith. Even if there were, however, the Court must employ a due process analysis to 
determine whether the Silver Smith could reasonably anticipate being haled into court in 
Utah and must balance the forum state's interest in the litigation with that of the foreign 
state and the parties. 
I lo's injuries did i lot ai ise fron I an.) conduct of the Silver Smith in Utah. iio 
alleges that the Silver Smith failed to maintain its premises safely, failed to warn and 
failed to properly train employees. Record at 1-7. None of this conduct arises out of or is 
related to the Silver Smith's transacting business in I Mali oi r\\ nun.!, operating or 
possessing real pmpnlv in 1 Mali In addition, Ho's injuries were caused in Nevada, not in 
Utah. Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot meet her relatively light burden of making a prima 
facie showing of specific personal jurisdiction over the Silver Smith. 
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Utah does not have nearly the interest in adjudicating Plaintiffs claim as does 
Nevada, a state with a strong interest in ensuring that its hotels and casinos are maintained 
in a reasonably safe condition for its guests. Plaintiffs interest in having her claim 
efficiently and fairly litigated would have been promoted in Nevada. 
Accordingly, Utah's long arm statute does not confer specific personal jurisdiction 
over State Line Hotel, and the trial court properly granted Silver Smith's Motion to 
Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction. 
III. Silver Smith did not conceal directly adverse legal authority from the court or 
Ho. First, any issue with respect to the trial court's not considering Buddensick in 
deciding Silver Smith's motion to dismiss is moot. The court considered Buddensick in 
ruling on Ho's motion to reconsider. If the trial court found Buddensick to be directly 
adverse, it could have vacated its minute entry granting the motion to dismiss. Moreover, 
the court's ruling is reviewed for correctness. Thus, if this court determines that the trial 
court properly granted the motion to dismiss, it is irrelevant whether the trial court 
actually considered Buddensick. 
Second, Buddensick is not directly adverse. 
"In determining whether a foreign corporation is doing business in a state 
for jurisdictional purposes, each case factually must be examined as it 
arises. A hard and fast formula cannot determine algebraically every case." 
Buddensick 972 P.2d at 930 (quoting McGriff v. Charles Antell Inc., 123 Utah 166, 256 
P.2d 703, 704 (1953)) (emphasis added). Buddensick is not directly adverse authority, 
and the Rules of Professional Conduct do not require adverse parties to cite as authority 
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cases which are simply unfavorable. The conduct of the State Line in Buddensick which 
supported the Court of Appeals' holding that Utah courts could exercise general personal 
jurisdiction over the State Line was far more extensive than the Silver Smith s condtnl 
Jim's Enterprise, Inc. and State I ine I lotel, Inc. ai e different entities; and "I Jtah law 
requires that "each case factually must be examined as it arises. " Id. 
Third, Ho alleged only specific personal jurisdiction in her complaint, and cited 
specifically to Utah's Long Arm Statute. Record at 2. Silver Smith argued in its 
principal memorandum that there was no specific personal jurisdiction Plaintiff iinelun It d 
J tenuous .ygtminil in hei mnnommlum in opposition that general personal jurisdiction 
was appropriate, but did not plead it, did not seek to amend her complaint and did not 
seek discovery on jurisdiction (other than the two interrogatories she previously 
submitted which sought jurisdictional facts); as was her right under Anderson \, Anient an 
Society of Plastic Surgeons, 807 V 2d K25 (I Itah 1990), cert, denied, 502 U.S. 900, 116 
L.Ed. 2d 228, 112 S.Ct. 276 (1991). 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THIS COURT DOES NOT HAVE GENERAL PERSONAL 
JURISDICTION OVER THE DEFENDANT 
Jurisdiction over the person is broken down into two categories. A court can have 
general jurisdiction or specific personal jurisdiction over a defendant. This Court has 
stated: 
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General personal jurisdiction permits a court to exercise power over a 
defendant without regard to the subject of the claim asserted. For such 
jurisdiction to exist, the defendant must be conducting substantial and 
continuous local activity in the forum state. In contrast, specific personal 
jurisdiction gives a court power over a defendant only with respect to 
claims arising out of the particular activities of the defendant in the forum 
state. For such jurisdiction to exist, the defendant must have certain 
minimum local contacts. 
Arguello v. Industrial Woodworking Machine Co., 838 P.2d 1120, 1122 (Utah 1992) 
(emphasis added) (citing Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 
408, 414 (1984)); Abbot G.M. Diesel, Inc., v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 578 P.2d 850, 853 n.6 
(Utah 1978). 
In Mallory Engineering, Inc. v. TedR. Brown & Associates, Inc., 618 P.2d 1004 
(Utah 1980) cert, denied, 449 U.S. 1029, 66 L.Ed. 2d 492,101 S.Ct. 602 (1980), the Utah 
Supreme Court explained the distinction between the "minimal contact" and "doing 
business" standards. 
The significance of the difference is found in part in the distinction between 
general jurisdiction and special jurisdiction. If the defendant's nexus with 
the state is such that he is "doing business" in the state, the jurisdiction of 
the court applies generally and he is rendered amenable in the state courts 
for any cause of action. This jurisdictional standard is embodied in 
U.R.C.P. § 4(e)(4), and the Long Arm Statute need not be employed. 
Conversely, if the activities of the defendant are limited in nature or 
transitory in duration, the courts may assume jurisdiction over that person 
only in relation to causes of action related to the activity of the defendant in 
the state. To assume this "special" jurisdiction, the courts must employ the 
Long Arm Statute. 
Id. at 1006 n.4 (citing Producer's Livestock Loan Co. v. Miller, 580 P.2d 603, 605 (Utah 
1978); Strachan, In Personam Jurisdiction in Utah, 1977 UTAHL. REV. 235 (1977)). See 
8 
also 41)boi G h I Diesel, 578 P.2d at 853 n.6, wherein the Court, quoting the Strachan 
article, stated that general personal jurisdiction requires "substantial and continuous local 
activity"; Burt Drilling, Inc. v. Portadrill, 608 P.2d 244 (Utah M } (defendant was IMI 
doing business in Utah which would require substan * ty; 
tiefendarif did not sell products tor use in I tah except to plaintiff). 
As with specific jurisdiction, a state's power to exercise "general" jurisdiction is 
limited by the Due Process Clause. In Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia s J ; 
466U.S.408, 80 L.Ed.2d 404, 104S.i t ISOK (1983), a general v •• ^ 
United States Supicme 1 ouit confirmed thul ' p| I Pit; (>nr Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment operates to limit the power of the State to assert in personam jurisdiction 
over a nonresident defendant." 466 U.S. at 413-14.1 
In Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining C o., A 2 11 S 45? % I .hi 48!) m,2 
S.Ct. 413 (1952), a shareholder sued the mining company in Ohio, e\ en though the 
corporation was organized under the law s of the Philippine Islands I he United States 
SiipieDH* ("out! framed the issue as "whether, as a matter of federal due process, the 
business done in Ohio by the respondent mining company was sufficiently substantial and 
of such a nature as to permit Ohio to entertain a cause of action against a foreign 
1
 In Buddensick v. Stateline Hotel, Inc., 972 P.2d 928 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), the court 
of appeals failed to consider the Due Process implications of its decision. Silver Smith 
respectfully contends that the Utah Court of Appeals' decision is in conflict with 
controlling United States Supreme Court authority. Helicopteros Nacionales de 
Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1983); Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining 
Co., 342 U.S. 437(1952). 
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corporation, where the cause of action arose from activities entirely distinct from its 
activities in Ohio." Perkins, 342 U.S. at 447. The Court then summarized Benguet's 
activities in Ohio as follows: 
The company's mining properties were in the Philippine Islands. Its 
operations there were completely halted during the occupation of the 
Islands by the Japanese. During that interim the president, who was also 
the general manager and principal stockholder of the company, returned to 
his home in Clermont County, Ohio. There he maintained an office in 
which he conducted his personal affairs and did many things on behalf of 
the company. He kept there office files of the company. He carried on 
there correspondence relating to the business of the company and to its 
employees. He drew and distributed there salary checks on behalf of the 
company, both in his own favor as president and in favor of two company 
secretaries who worked there with him. He used and maintained in 
Clermont County, Ohio, two active bank accounts carrying substantial 
balances of company funds. A bank in Hamilton County, Ohio, acted as 
transfer agent for the stock of the company. Several directors' meetings 
were held at his office or home in Clermont County. From that office he 
supervised policies dealing with the rehabilitation of the corporation's 
properties in the Philippines and he dispatched funds to cover purchases of 
machinery for such rehabilitation. Thus he carried on in Ohio a continuous 
and systematic supervision of the necessarily limited wartime activities of 
the company. 
Id. at 447-48. Under these circumstances, the Court permitted Ohio to exercise 
jurisdiction over the mining company for matters unrelated to the forum state activity. 
On the other end of the spectrum is Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. 
Hall 466 U.S. 408, 80 L.Ed.2d 404, 104 S.Ct. 1868 (1983). There, the plaintiffs were 
residents of Texas and heirs of persons killed in a helicopter crash in Peru. They sought 
to assert jurisdiction over the helicopter operator, a Colombian corporation, in Texas. 
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The United States Supreme Court stated that "[w]e thus must explore the nature of 
Helicol's contacts with the State of Texas to determine whether they constitute the kind of 
continuous and systematic general business contacts that the Court found to exist in 
Perkins."/*/ at 4 1 ' If), Hit1*' ouit sutnmaii/nl Hdirnrs ,n*l»\ ilies in Texas as follows: 
It is undisputed that Helicol does not have a place of business in Texas and 
never has been licensed to do business in the State. Basically, Helicol's 
contacts with Texas consisted of sending its chief executive officer to 
Houston for a contract-negotiation session; accepting into its New York 
bank account checks drawn on a Houston bank, purchasing helicopters, 
equipment, and training services from Bell Helicopter for substantial sums; 
and sending personnel to Bell's facilities in Fort Worth for training. 
iu1 ul-IK) On thi1- loioul (hi ' I H ii I »"one I tided that "Helicol's contacts with the State of 
Texas were insufficient to satisfy the requirements of the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 419. 
In this case, the Silver Smith's contacts do not rise to t!: rkins 
necessary for I Jtal I to exercise general personal jurisdiction o v ei the Silver Smith, nor 
does the Silver Smith's activity even rise to the level considered insufficient in 
Helicopteros. The Silver Smith's contacts with Utah may be placed in three categories: 
(1) advertising activities; (2) purchasing goods and services from Utah merchants; arid (3) 
leasing Utah real property for parking lot and storage pi n poses ' Fills condi ict does not 
come close In (lie type of pervasive activity found in Perkins which justified an exercise 
of jurisdiction over actions completely unrelated to the non-resident's forum state 
activities. 
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The Utah Court of Appeals recently determined that the Utah activities of another 
Wendover hotel and casino operated by a Nevada corporation, State Line Hotel, Inc., 
were substantial and continuous and that Utah courts could exercise general personal 
jurisdiction over it. Buddensick v. Stateline Hotel Inc., 972 P.2d 928, 931 (Utah Ct. App. 
1998) cert denied, 982 P.2d 88 (Utah 1999), cert, denied, 145 L.Ed. 2d 253, 120 S.Ct. 
324 (1999). In that case, discovery was conducted concerning the State Line's contacts 
with Utah and it revealed that the State Line 
advertised its hotel and casino in Utah; contracts for goods and services in 
Utah; uses a Utah insurance agent and a Utah law firm; leases from 
Stateline Properties at least five parcels of property in Utah, two of which 
are used for a parking lot, parking structure, and signage purposes directly 
adjacent to Stateline's hotel and casino business in Nevada; maintains at 
least two post office boxes in Utah, one of which Stateline shares with 
Stateline Properties; and has a Utah cellular telephone number, regular 
telephone number, and six Utah fax numbers. 
Id. at 929. 
By contrast, the evidence before the trial court in this case was that the Silver 
Smith advertises in Utah, purchases some goods and services from Utah merchants, and is 
the lessee under a lease of real property in Utah for parking lot and storage purposes. 
Record at 19, 72, 73. The court of appeals in Buddensick held: 
For the following reasons, we conclude that Stateline's activities are 
"substantial and continuous" such that Utah may assert general personal 
jurisdiction over Stateline. First, Stateline conducts extensive advertising 
and promotional activities in Utah, including a toll-free telephone number. 
Next, Stateline leases and possesses at least five parcels of real property in 
Utah, including property neighboring its casino for a parking lot and 
signage purposes. Further, Stateline contracts for goods and services with 
Utah corporations, including food, linens, advertisements, and professional 
12 
services. Lastly, Stateline maintains two phone numbers, at least two post 
office boxes, and six fax numbers in Utah. Thus, it is not unreasonable for 
Stateline to be expected to be "hauled into court" in Utah. See World-Wide 
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291-99, 100 S Ct. **9. %4~ 
67,62L.Ed.2d490(1980). 
Buddensick, 972 l\2d at 931. 
Mo argues iii IHT brief thai the Silver Smith's activities in Utah are substantially 
identical to the State Line's activities in Utah. The record, however, shows that the Silver 
Smith's Utah activities are as stated above: advertising, purchasing goods and services 
and entering into a lease of Utah property for parking lot and storage purposes • , 
however, attached to It'1! hurl mullets« nnlmninp discovery from other cases not 
involving the Silver Smith, information from the Internet, advertising and telephone book 
listings, State of Nevada filings concerning Jim's Enterprises, Inc., copies of old 
stationery of State Line Properties, Ltd. (a Utah limited partnership) ai id insurance policy 
pages from another case Sec ullaelimcnls A-Ci, l-K of appellant's brief. None of these 
items was submitted to the trial court and should not be considered by this Court. 
Matters not admitted in evidence before the trier of fact cannot be considered for the first 
time on appeal. Pilcherv. State Dept of Social Servs., 663 P,2d 4 SO, 45? (Utah 1083); 
UtahDept of Transportation v I 'ullcr. M11 I\2d 81 4, 81 " (Utah 1«>7<>); Ebbert v. Ebbert, 
744P.2d lOMMIItuhl I A|.|> I (>K71, cert denied, 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988). 
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A. Advertising in Another State is Generally Insufficient 
to Confer General Personal Jurisdiction 
Virtually all individual and corporate residents of states have some contact with 
other states. Silver Smith advertises in Utah and purchases goods and services from Utah 
merchants. Record at 19, 72. In regard to advertising, Silver Smith is like any other 
lodging or entertainment operation located in one state which promotes its business to 
citizens of another state. Many courts have held that advertising and promotion are not 
"doing business" sufficient to give rise to general jurisdiction. 
In State ex rel Circus Circus Reno, Inc. v. Pope, 317 Or. 151, 854 P.2d 461 
(1993), an Oregon resident traveled to Reno, Nevada, and stayed at a hotel operated by 
Circus Circus. The plaintiff was injured when he was hit by a liquor bottle thrown by an 
unknown person from a window of the hotel. He sued Circus Circus, claiming 
negligence. In Oregon, general jurisdiction can be obtained over a defendant who is 
engaged in "substantial and not isolated activities within this state." 854 P.2d at 462. The 
plaintiff argued that Circus Circus was subject to the state's general jurisdiction. The 
Court listed the contacts of Circus Circus with Oregon: 
It is undisputed by the parties that Circus Circus is not registered to 
do business in Oregon, pays no business tax here, and has no bank accounts, 
offices, real estate, employees, or exclusive agents in the state. [Plaintiff] 
argues, however, that the activities of Circus Circus in Oregon nevertheless 
are "substantial," because Circus Circus "regularly advertises its Reno hotel 
in The Oregonian, because it distributed brochures describing that hotel to 
Smith's Oregon travel agent, because it maintains a toll-free number for use 
of Oregon residents, and because, after Smith reserved a room at its Reno 




The court stated that it was not persuaded that the foregoing activities were 
substantial and not isolated activities within the state. The court then rejected the specific 
jurisdiction argument because the immediate effects of the plaintiffs injury were felt 
within Nevada and not within Oregon as required by Oregon's long-arm statute. Id. at 
463. 
In Munley v. Second Judicial District Court, 761 P.2d 414 (Nev. 1988), the 
plaintiff, a Nevada resident, was injured at a Lake Tahoe ski resort called "Northstar." He 
sued Northstar in Nevada but Northstar claimed a lack of personal jurisdiction. The court 
listed Northstar's contacts with Nevada: 
The evidence presented to the district court shows that Northstar's contacts 
with Nevada consisted solely of advertising and promotional activities. 
These activities included continuous membership in the Reno/Sparks 
Chamber of Commerce since 1984, the maintenance of a contract with a 
Reno outdoor advertising company, the placement of one advertisement in 
the Las Vegas Review Journal, the placement of an advertisement in the 
Reno telephone directory, and the distribution of brochures to several ski 
shops and sporting goods stores in the Reno area. 
M a t 415. 
The court in Munley rejected any argument that the requirements for general 
jurisdiction had been met. "None of Northstar's promotional activities evince a pattern of 
'substantial and continuous1 activities within this state sufficient to give rise to a presence 
in Nevada and to confer general jurisdiction on the district court." Id. at 416. 
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Similarly, in Congoleum Corp. v. D.L. W. Aktiengesellschaft, 729 F.2d 1240 (9th 
Cir. 1984), the court of appeals affirmed a district court's dismissal of the complaint for 
lack of personal jurisdiction over the German defendant. In that case, the defendant's 
only activities in the forum state of California consisted of sales and marketing efforts 
through a California company and a consultant. The activities of the company and the 
consultant as agents for D.L.W. consisted of the solicitation of orders, the 
recommendation of other sales agents, the ordering of samples, the promotion of D.L.W. 
products to potential customers through mail and showroom display, and attendance at 
trade shows and sales meetings. In affirming the dismissal for lack of personal 
jurisdiction, the court stated: 
Although many courts cite Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 
342 U.S. 437 (1952)] for the principle that personal jurisdiction may be 
asserted where the cause of action is unrelated to the forum activity, no 
court has ever held that the maintenance of even a substantial sales force 
within the state is a sufficient contact to assert jurisdiction in an unrelated 
cause of action. 
Id. at 1242 (emphasis added). 
Finally, in Price & Sons v. District Court, 831 P.2d 600 (Nev. 1992), the court 
held that the Nevada courts did not have general jurisdiction over an out-of-state 
membership department store, the Price Club, which had over 1,000 members in Nevada. 
The Price Club regularly sent advertisements to its members and solicited memberships in 
Nevada through an advertising flyer distributed through a Nevada credit union. The court 
noted that general personal jurisdiction over a defendant for any cause of action is 
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appropriate where the defendant's forum activities are so substantial or continuous and 
systematic that the defendant may be deemed to be present in the forum state. "A high 
level of contact with the forum state is necessary to establish general jurisdiction. Sales 
and marketing efforts in the forum by a foreign corporation, without more, are 
insufficient to establish general jurisdiction" Id. at 601 (emphasis added) (citations 
omitted). 
In its opinion in Buddensick, the Court of Appeals placed principal reliance on this 
Court's decision in McGriffV. Charles Antell Inc., 123 Utah 166, 256 P.2d 703, (1953). 
There, this Court stated: 
The law, in our opinion, would be a faithless servant if today it demanded 
that solicitation of business in and of itself subjected a foreign corporation 
to the local forum. 
Id. at 704. This Court did conclude that "this is not to say that in a proper case solicitation 
plus something else, or use of radio plus something else, could not constitute doing 
business in the jurisdiction." Id. at 704-05. 
The McGr/^decision was but one of many decisions rendered by this Court which 
became known collectively as the "solicitation plus" cases. See Strachan, In Personam 
Jurisdiction in Utah, 1977 UTAH L. REV. 235, 236-37 (1977). In her article, Professor 
Strachan concluded that McGriff and the other "solicitation plus" cases were of limited 
value due to the lack of consistent analysis and reasoning: 
Some general observations may be helpful to an understanding of the 
"solicitation plus" cases. First, these cases were of slight precedential 
value. 
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* * * 
Second, the court's approach was mechanical, quantitative, and 
fairly simplistic. The court would typically refer to its checklist of "plus" 
factors, briefly note the presence or absence of items on the checklist and 
thereupon state its conclusion that the defendant was or was not doing 
business in Utah. There was no analysis of the relative importance of the 
"plus" factors and no indication of how many of the "plus" factors found to 
be present or absent were necessary to the jurisdictional holding. 
Third, although the court frequently stated that mere solicitation of 
business was insufficient to constitute doing business, in many cases the 
"plus" factors found to sustain personal jurisdiction were an integral part of 
the solicitation. For example, the court could have regarded activities such 
as maintaining a local office or local employees, installing a telephone and 
office equipment, advertising products, or delivering orders, as the means 
by which nonresident defendants solicited business within the state. Thus, 
the mere solicitation distinction was a misnomer. In reality, the 
"solicitation plus" standard of doing business was a flexible, though 
superficial, test by which the Utah Court considered the total quantity of a 
defendant's activity within the state. A limited quantity of activity would 
not permit the assertion of personal jurisdiction. Substantial and continuous 
activity by a nonresident defendant within the state, even though such 
activity was inextricably related to the solicitation of business, was 
sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction. 
Finally, although the "solicitation plus" cases generally contain little 
reasoned analysis, occasional decisions provide some insight into the 
conflicting policies underlying the court's strict jurisdictional standard of 
substantial and continuous local activity. In a few of the numerous 
decisions denying jurisdiction, the court founded its strict jurisdictional 
standard on its conviction that a more lenient standard would injure the 
welfare and economy of Utah by discouraging nonresidents from engaging 
in commercial activity in Utah.2 In contrast, in the few decisions upholding 
jurisdiction under the strict standard, the court occasionally based its 
conclusion on the ground that a contrary result would impose an unfair 
2
 See Western Gas Appl, Inc. v. Servel Inc. 123 Utah 229, 236-37, 257 P.2d 950, 953 
(1953); McGriffv. Charles Antell Inc. 123 Utah 166, 170, 71, 256 P.2d 703, 705 (1953). 
See also Conn v. Whitmore, 9 Utah 2d 250, 255, 342 P.2d 871, 875 (1959); Honerine 
Mining & Milling Co. v. Tallerday Steel Pipe & Tank Co., 31 Utah 326, 335, 88 P. 9, 12 
(1906). 
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burden upon local plaintiffs to travel to a distant forum for a remedy.3 
These two conflicting rationales were used to justify conclusions already 
reached through mechanical application of the "solicitation plus" test. The 
court never subjected the strict jurisdictional standard to critical 
analysis-never tested that standard against the facts of a given case to 
determine whether the standard was necessary to achieve the desired 
economic result-and thus, the court never recognized the inherent conflict 
between its two policy rationales. 
Id. (footnotes in original).4 
Silver Smith submits that this Court should define the nature of conduct which will 
subject a party to the general jurisdiction of the courts of Utah. After all, the United 
States Supreme Court has held that one of the primary aims of the Due Process Clause is 
to provide a degree of predictability to an exercise of jurisdiction: 
By requiring that individuals have "fair warning that a particular activity 
may subject [them] to the jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign," Schaefer v. 
Heitner, 433 US 186, 218, 53 L Ed 2d 683, 97 S Ct 2569 (1977)(Stevens, J., 
concurring in judgment), the Due Process Clause "gives a degree of 
predictability to the legal system that allows potential defendants to 
structure their primary conduct with some minimum assurance as to where 
that conduct will and will not render them liable to suit.," World-Wide 
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 US 286,297, 62 L Ed 2d 490, 100 S 
Ct 559 (1980). 
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, All U.S. 462, 472, 85 L.Ed.2d 528, 105 S.Ct. 2174 
(1985). 
3
 Wein v. Crockett, 113 Utah 301, 314, 195 P.2d 222, 228-29 (1948); Wabash R.R. v. 
District Court, 109 Utah 526, 537-38, 167 P.2d 973, 978 (1946). 
4
 Incidentally, Professor Strachan's "able article" was heavily relied upon by this Court 
in clarifying the distinction between "general" and "specific" jurisdiction. Abbott GM. 
Diesel Inc., v. Piper Aircraft, 578 P.2d 850, 852 (Utah 1978). 
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As a consequence of the lack of analysis contained in the "solicitation plus" cases, 
and the intervention of the concept of "specific" jurisdiction, this Court has had few, if 
any, opportunities to elucidate the nature of conduct which will subject a non-resident to 
the general jurisdiction of Utah courts for conduct unrelated to any forum state conduct. 
Moreover, aside from the issue of what conduct may constitute "doing business" in 
Utah, perhaps a more compelling question is whether the Silver Smith's conduct in Utah 
would permit the trial court to exercise jurisdiction consistent with the Due Process 
Clause. As set forth above, there is little dispute that, like specific jurisdiction, a state's 
exercise of general jurisdiction is limited by the Due Process Clause. However, neither 
this Court nor the Utah Court of Appeals has ever discussed the level of conduct 
necessary to constitutionally exercise jurisdiction over defendants for matters unrelated to 
the non-resident's forum state activities. 
Because the specific jurisdiction analysis often focuses on "traditional notions of 
fair play and justice" and the convenience to a defendant, it is often overlooked that the 
Due Process limitations on the jurisdictional power of the state also serve to maintain 
balance between the states. The United States Supreme Court has stated: 
Even if the defendant would suffer minimal or no inconvenience from being 
forced to litigate before the tribunals of another State; even if the forum 
State has a strong interest in applying its laws to the controversy; even if the 
forum State is the most convenient location for litigation, the Due Process 
Clause, acting as an instrument of interstate federalism, may sometimes act 
to divest the State of its power to render a valid judgment. 
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World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, AAA U.S. 286,294-95, 62 L.Ed.2d 490, 100 
S.Ct. 559 (1979). The Court has also stated: 
Nevertheless, we have never accepted the proposition that state lines 
are irrelevant for jurisdictional purposes, nor could we, and remain faithful 
to the principles of interstate federalism embodied in the Constitution. The 
economic interdependence of the States was foreseen and desired by the 
Framers. In the Commerce Clause, they provided that the Nation was to be 
a common market, a "free trade unit" in which the States are debarred from 
acting as separate economic entities. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 
336 US 525, 538, 93 L Ed 865, 69 S Ct 657 (1949). But the Framers also 
intended that the States retain many essential attributes of sovereignty, 
including, in particular, the sovereign power to try causes in their courts. 
The sovereignty of each State, in turn, implied a limitation on the 
sovereignty of all of its sister States—a limitation express or implicit in both 
the original scheme of the Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Hence, even while abandoning the shibboleth that "[t]he authority of 
every tribunal is necessarily restricted by the territorial limits of the State in 
which it is established," Pennoyer v. Neff, supra, at 720, 24 L Ed 565, we 
emphasized that the reasonableness of asserting jurisdiction must be 
assessed "in the context of our federal system of government," International 
Shoe Co. v. Washington, supra., at 317, 90 L Ed 95, 66 S Ct 154, 161 ALR 
1057, and stressed that the Due Process Clause ensures not only fairness, 
but also the "orderly administration of the laws." 
Id. 
These considerations become far more critical when a state seeks to exercise 
jurisdiction over non-residents for conduct and matters occurring entirely without its 
boundaries. When a state exercises specific jurisdiction over a non-resident for activities 
relating to the forum, the state does no more than call the non-resident to account for 
activities conducted within the forum state. However, general jurisdiction is an exercise 
of power over a non-resident and regarding activities and conduct that occurred outside 
the State of Utah, and which the State has a minimal interest in controlling. Thus, the 
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exercise of general jurisdiction is a far greater assertion of power within the system of 
interstate federalism, and consequently, requires a higher level of conduct before Due 
Process concerns are satisfied. 
When, as here, the plaintiff is a resident of the forum state, it is easy to forget that 
a finding of "general" jurisdiction is an assertion by this Court that it may, consistent with 
the Due Process Clause, exercise jurisdiction over matters entirely unrelated to the forum 
state activities. For example, if this Court concludes that general jurisdiction exists, the 
Court would be concluding that it would have the power to hear a dispute brought by a 
Maine resident who alleged she slipped and fell at the Silver Smith. Moreover, if an 
employee of the Silver Smith were involved in an automobile accident in Idaho with an 
Idaho resident, general jurisdiction would permit the Idaho resident to sue in Utah. This 
Court should be ever-cognizant that a finding of general jurisdiction would extend this 
Court's power to regulate the Silver Smith to conduct not only arising entirely outside 
Utah, but also over disputes between the Silver Smith and residents of any other state. 
Because general jurisdiction extends to matters unrelated to the forum state activities of 
the Defendant, the plaintiff need not necessarily be a resident of Utah to avail itself of this 
forum's jurisdiction. 
The issue of the level of conduct necessary for a Utah court to exercise general 
jurisdiction consistent with the Due Process Clause has never been addressed by this 
Court, but remains an important question of state and federal law which should be 
decided by this Court. 
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B. Silver Smith's Leasing Real Property in Utah 
is not Enough to Confer General Jurisdiction 
Plaintiff has not cited any authority for the proposition that a foreign defendant's 
leasing real property in the forum state will result in the defendant's being haled into 
court for all purposes. 
Plaintiff does, however, miscite Hebertson v. Willowcreek Plaza, 895 P.2d 839 
(Utah Ct App. 1995), affd, 923 P.2d 1389 (Utah 1996), apparently for the proposition 
that leasing real property may result in a finding of general personal jurisdiction. The 
sole issue in Hebertson was whether the owners of the real property on which the plaintiff 
was injured did business as Willowcreek Plaza, which was the name given to the 
property. Id. at 840. The court, however, made reference to doing business for 
jurisdictional purposes and listed the ownership of property as a factor to consider. Id. at 
840-41. The court cited Radcliffe v. Akhavan, 875 P.2d 608 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); 
however, Radcliffe was a specific personal jurisdiction case. 
Accordingly, the Silver Smith's activities in Utah are not substantial and 
continuous such that the Silver Smith is doing business in Utah. Moreover, a conclusion 




PLAINTIFFS INJURIES DID NOT ARISE OUT OF DEFENDANT'S 
CONTACTS WITH UTAH; THEREFORE, NO SPECIFIC 
PERSONAL JURISDICTION EXISTS 
To determine whether specific personal jurisdiction over the Silver Smith exists, 
one must turn to Utah's Long Arm Statute. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-24 (Supp. 1999) 
provides: 
Any person, notwithstanding Section 16-10a-1501, whether or not a 
citizen or resident of this state, who in person or through an agent does any 
of the following enumerated acts, submits himself... to the jurisdiction of 
the courts of this state as to any claim arising from or related to: 
(1) the transaction of any business within this state; 
(2) contracting to supply services or goods in this state; 
(3) the causing of any injury within this state whether tortious or by breach 
of warranty; 
(4) the ownership, use, or possession of any real estate situated in this state. 
A. Plaintiffs Injuries Must Arise Out of or Relate to Defendant's Contacts 
With Utah for the Long Arm Statute to Apply 
Plaintiff was injured when she was in the Silver Smith casino waiting for a gaming 
table and was struck by a Silver Smith employee with a drink tray. Plaintiff was not 
injured as a result of advertising or promotion of the Silver Smith, nor as a result of Silver 
Smith's obtaining goods and services from Utah merchants nor as a result of State Line's 
leasing real property in Utah. Unquestionably, her injury was not caused in Utah. 
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There is no question but that the alleged injury must arise out of or be related to 
the Silver Smith's contacts with Utah for Utah to exercise specific personal jurisdiction 
over the Silver Smith under the Long Arm Statute. Roskelley & Co. v. Lerco, Inc., 610 
P.2d 1307, 1311 (Utah 1980). In Roskelley, the Utah Supreme Court stated that it does 
not assist plaintiff to show the contacts defendant has with Utah if the specific litigation 
does not arise out of any of these contacts. Id. See also Abbot G.M. Diesel, Inc. v. Piper 
Aircraft Corp., 578 P.2d 850, 853 (Utah 1978) ("'where the defendant has only minimum 
contacts with the forum [i.e., no general jurisdiction exists], personal jurisdiction may be 
asserted only on claims arising out of the defendant's forum-state activity.1") (citation 
omitted.) 
Finally, there is a constitutional due process element to personal jurisdiction. In 
Arguello v. Indus. Woodworking Machine Co., 838 P.2d 1120 (Utah 1992), the Utah 
Supreme Court stated: 
To exercise jurisdiction consistent with due process, the non-resident 
defendant must have "minimum contacts with the forum state such that the 
maintenance of this suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and 
substantial justice.1" 
Id. at 1123, quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 90 L.Ed. 
95,66S.Ct. 154(1945). 
The defendant must have purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting 
activities in Utah and must have reasonably anticipated being haled into court in Utah. 
Kamdar & Co. v. Laray Co., Inc., 815 P.2d 245, 249 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (citations 
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omitted). In addition, the court must balance the convenience of the parties and the 
interests of the state in assuming jurisdiction by examining the relationship of the 
defendant, the forum and the litigation to each other. Id. 
Although the Silver Smith purposefully availed itself of purchasing advertising, 
services and goods in Utah, it cannot be said that, as a result, it reasonably anticipated 
being summoned into a Utah court for an incident that occurred in Nevada, on its 
premises. 
In World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980), the United 
States Supreme Court discussed the concept of minimum contacts. It stated: 
It protects the defendant against the burdens of litigating in a distant or 
inconvenient forum. And it acts to ensure that the States, through their 
courts, do not reach out beyond the limits imposed on them by their status 
as coequal sovereigns in a federal system. 
Id. at 292 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). The Court noted that although the limits 
imposed on state jurisdiction by the Due Process Clause have been relaxed over the years, 
"we have never accepted the proposition that state lines are irrelevant for jurisdictional 
purposes, nor could we, and remain faithful to the principles of interstate federalism 
embodied in the Constitution." Id. at 293. The Court noted that although the framers of 
the Constitution foresaw that the nation would be a common market, they also 
intended that the States retain many essential attributes of sovereignty, 
including, in particular, the sovereign power to try causes in their courts. 
The sovereignty of each State, in turn, implied a limitation on the 
sovereignty of all its sister States — a limitation express or implicit in both 
the original scheme of the Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment. 
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Id. at 293. 
Finally, the Court observed that the Due Process Clause does not contemplate that 
a state can make binding judgments against individuals or corporate defendants with 
which the state has no contacts, ties or relations. 
Even if the defendant would suffer minimal or no inconvenience from being 
forced to litigate before the tribunals of another State; even if the forum 
State has a strong interest in applying its law to the controversy; even if the 
forum State is the most convenient location for litigation, the Due Process 
Clause, acting as an instrument of interstate federalism, may sometimes act 
to divest the State of its power to render a valid judgment. 
Id. at 294 (citing Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283, 78 S.Ct. 1228 
(1958)). 
In applying the relevant factors listed by the Court in determining the 
reasonableness of requiring a foreign defendant to litigate a case in the forum, none of the 
factors support keeping this case in Utah. Utah has little interest in adjudicating this 
personal injury lawsuit which arose in Nevada between a Nevada corporation and a Utah 
resident. Certainly Utah has much less interest in adjudicating this dispute than does 
Nevada. Although Ho has an interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief, her 
interests would have been promoted by litigating her suit in Nevada, a state which has a 
keen interest in ensuring safe environments for visitors to its hotels and casinos. 
B. Plaintiffs Injuries Did Not, Factually or Legally, Arise Out of 
Defendant's Advertising Its Business in Utah 
In her complaint, Ho alleges a negligence cause of action. Record at 1-7. She 
claims she was injured while waiting for a gaming table in the casino when an employee 
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struck her with a drink tray. She claims that Silver Smith had a duty to maintain its 
premises in a safe manner and that it breached that duty. She claims she was injured as a 
result and is entitled to special and general damages. 
In her brief, however, Ho claims that this court has specific personal jurisdiction 
over the Silver Smith because her injury arose out of Silver Smith's advertising and 
promotional activities in Utah. Brief of Appellant at 45. There is no record support for 
Ho's claim that her injuries arose from Defendant's advertising, but even if there were, 
that would not change the fact that her injuries did not arise out of or relate to the 
advertising. 
Ho relies on two decisions from the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, both of 
which have been vacated or reversed. Plaintiff relies on Alexander v. Circus Circus 
Enterprises, Inc., 939 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1991), for that court's analysis, which is that but 
for the defendant's forum-related activities in soliciting business, the plaintiff would not 
have gone to the defendant's place of business and been injured. Id. at 853. The court in 
Alexander relied on Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 897 F.2d 377 (9th Cir. 1990). 
As stated, neither Alexander nor Shute are good law. In Alexander v. Circus 
Circus Enterprises, Inc., 972 F.2d 261 (9th Cir. 1992), the court of appeals withdrew its 
earlier opinion reported at 939 F.2d 847, upon which Plaintiff relies. In the later decision, 
the court granted the defendant's petition for rehearing, withdrew its prior opinion, and 
affirmed the district court's quashing service of summons and dismissing the complaint 
based on absence of personal jurisdiction. 972 F.2d at 262. Shute was reversed in 
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Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585,113 L.Ed.2d 622, 111 S.Ct. 1522 
(1991). On remand to the Ninth Circuit, 934 F.2d 1091, the court of appeals affirmed the 
judgment of the district court which had originally granted the cruise line's motion for 
summary judgment on lack of personal jurisdiction. 
To the extent the Ninth Circuit's "but for" analysis survives, however, it is a 
distinctly minority position and has been sharply criticized.5 This Court has addressed 
and rejected such a broad reading of the Long Arm Statute in Roskelly & Co. v. Lerco, 
Inc., 610 P.2d 1307 (Utah 1980). In Roskelly, Justice Stewart dissented from the majority 
and advocated a broad construction of the phrase "arising out o f to include any injury 
which "lies in the wake o f or has a "close relationship" with the defendant's forum state 
activities. Id. at 1316. However, the majority concluded that "the broad construction the 
dissent would give the term 'arose from' is unwarranted, and is unsupported by the cases 
cited therein." Id. at 1310. 
5
 In State ex rel Circus Circus v. Pope, 317 Or. 151, 854 P.2d 461 (1993), the Oregon 
Supreme Court reject the plaintiffs "but for" argument: 
The Supreme Court of the United States does not apply a "but for" test, and 
our reading of the pertinent Supreme Court cases convinces us that the 
Supreme Court would not do so. We therefore decline Smith's invitation to 
adopt the proposed "but for" test. 
854 P.2d at 466. See also Wims v. Beach Terrace Motor Inn, Inc., 759 F. Supp. 264, 267 
(E.D. Pa. 1991) (most courts addressing the issue have concluded that when plaintiffs 
bring actions for personal injuries that occurred in another state and which allegedly 
resulted from the defendant's negligent acts which also occurred in another state, the 
cause of action does not arise from the defendant's forum contacts for purposes of 
asserting personal jurisdiction). 
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Utah's Long Arm Statute was amended recently to include the language, "or 
related to." In State ex rel Circus Circus, the Court construed Oregon's statute which 
also applies to conduct "aris[ing] out of or related to" the forum contacts and noted that 
by advertising its Reno facilities in a major Oregon newspaper, providing brochures to the 
plaintiffs travel agent, making available to Oregon residents a toll-free telephone 
information service, and telephoning plaintiff to confirm his hotel reservations, defendant 
purposefully directed its activities at residents of Oregon. "However, Smith's negligence 
claim against Circus Circus does not 'arise out of or relate to1 the activities of Circus 
Circus in Oregon." 854 P.2d at 466 (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, All U.S. 
462 (1985)). The court noted that plaintiff claimed that he was injured by a bottle thrown 
from a window of a hotel and that his injuries resulted from Circus Circus's negligence 
relating solely to the operation of its hotel in Nevada. Id. 
Similarly, in Munley v. Second Judicial District Court, 761 P.2d 414 (Nev. 1988), 
the court noted that even if Northstar's promotional activities in Nevada constituted 
transacting business, the plaintiff had failed to demonstrate that his cause of action arose 
from those activities. The court specifically noted that the plaintiff alleged in his 
Complaint that his injuries were proximately caused by the negligent management, 
maintenance and operation of the ski chair lifts in California. "Indeed, there is nothing in 
the record suggesting that Northstar's promotional activities in Nevada were related to its 
alleged negligence in maintaining and operating its California chair lifts." Id. at 415 
(citations omitted). Significantly, the court held that Northstar's promotional activities 
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did not confer jurisdiction on the district court "even though petitioner's trip to Northstar 
was in response to such promotional activities." Id. at 416. 
Ho's specific personal jurisdiction argument is really a general personal 
jurisdiction argument because it urges the Court to find personal jurisdiction based on 
Silver Smith's Utah activities for an injury that did not arise from them nor is related to 
them. In Union Ski Co. v. Union Plastics Corp., 548 P.2d 1257 (Utah 1976), the Utah 
Supreme Court observed that it is generally more fair and logical to find jurisdiction in 
the forum where the activity occurred out of which the cause of action arose. Id. at 1259. 
In this case, the Ho's cause of action arose, not out of the Silver Smith's contacts with 
Utah, but out of alleged negligence which occurred in Nevada. Thus, there is no specific 
personal jurisdiction over Silver Smith 
III. 
THE ISSUE OF WHETHER THE BUDDENSICK OPINION 
WAS CONSIDERED BY THE TRIAL COURT IS MOOT AND HO'S 
ARGUMENTS IN THIS REGARD FAIL 
Ho claims that Silver Smith's failure to cite to the Buddensick opinion did not 
allow the trial court an opportunity to make an informed decision as to whether the trial 
court could exercise general personal jurisdiction over Silver Smith. This argument fails 
for a number of reasons. 
First, the trial court was, in fact, given the opportunity to review Buddensick 
during the briefing of Ho's Motion to Reconsider. After the trial court entered its minute 
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entry granting Silver Smith's Motion to Dismiss, Ho researched Utah law regarding 
general personal jurisdiction and discovered the Buddensick decision. Ho believed that 
Buddensick should have been considered by the trial court and so she filed a Motion to 
Reconsider in which she fully summarized and argued the facts and law of Buddensick. 
Record at 82-127. She also attached a copy of Buddensick to her memorandum. Record 
at 120-23. In opposition to the Motion to Reconsider, Silver Smith presented written 
arguments to the trial court regarding Buddensick. Record at 132-34. Ho presented yet 
more arguments based on Buddensick in her reply memorandum. Record at 139-63. 
Thus, the trial court was made well aware of Buddensick. If the trial court had found 
Ho's jurisdictional arguments based on Buddensick persuasive, it could have granted the 
Motion to Reconsider and set aside its minute entry on the Motion to Dismiss. Therefore, 
the trial court had a more than adequate opportunity to consider the effect, if any, of 
Buddensick on the jurisdictional issues raised in the Motion to Dismiss. Hence, the issue 
of Silver Smith's alleged non-disclosure of Buddensick is moot because Buddensick was 
disclosed to the trial court and it considered Buddensick in deciding whether to reconsider 
its ruling on the Motion to Dismiss. In fact, the court did not enter the Order of Dismissal 
until after it denied the Motion to Reconsider. Record at 170-71, 172-73. Significantly, 
the trial court's granting the motion to dismiss will be reviewed for correctness. Thus, if 
the trial court properly or improperly granted the motion, this court will affirm or reverse 
the order, and it is irrelevant whether the trial court considered Buddensick. 
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Second, there is a genuine issue as to whether Silver Smith was required to cite to 
Buddensick at any time below. Rule 3.3(a)(3) of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct 
states: "[a] lawyer shall not knowingly fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the 
controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the 
client and not disclosed by opposing counsel." Silver Smith is unaware of any Utah 
appellate cases or other Utah authority that has interpreted the above rule. While Ho, in 
her brief, cites to cases from other jurisdictions and the notes of the American Bar 
Association Committee on Professional Ethics, these opinions are not binding on this 
Court or Utah lawyers. See Regional Sales Agency, Inc v. Reichert, 830 P.2d 252, 256 
(Utah 1992) (stating that the Court looks to ABA advisory committee notes and cases 
from other jurisdictions for guidance). 
The issue under Rule 3.3(a)(3) is whether the Buddensick opinion is "directly 
adverse" to the interests of Silver Smith in the present case. The terms "directly adverse" 
can and should be read as meaning controlling or dispositive authority. The use of the 
word "directly" indicates that only controlling or dispositive authority must be disclosed. 
If the intended meaning was authority that bears on the issue in a negative way, then the 
word "directly" would not have been used because the word "adverse" alone would have 
sufficed. Thus, a reasonable interpretation of the rule required counsel for Silver Smith to 
disclose Buddensick only if it was dispositive of the jurisdictional issue. 
While it is true that Buddensick addresses the issue of general personal jurisdiction 
in Utah, it does not establish a precedent that necessarily would have defeated Silver 
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Smith's Motion to Dismiss. Rather, Buddensick reviewed prior case law and compiled a 
list of factors to consider when determining if general personal jurisdiction exists. 
Buddensick, 972 P.2d at 930-31. Based on its review of the factors applicable to the 
defendant casino, the Buddensick court found that the Utah trial court could properly 
exercise general personal jurisdiction over the defendant casino. Id. at 931. Contrary to 
what Ho would have the Court believe, it does not stand for the proposition that Utah 
courts have general personal jurisdiction over all Wendover casinos. The determination 
of general personal jurisdiction is a fact intensive process and the circumstances of each 
case must be addressed individually. Id. at 930. The Buddensick court emphasized the 
factual nature of the determination: "each case factually must be examined as it arises. A 
hard and fast formula cannot determine algebraically every case." Id. (quoting McGriffv. 
Charles Antell, Inc., 256 P.2d 703, 704 (Utah 1953)). As discussed more fully above, 
Buddensick was a separate case with a different defendant and distinct circumstances. 
The ruling as to the defendant casino in Buddensick does not apply directly to Silver 
Smith in the present case. The defendant casino in Buddensick had many more contacts 
with the state than Silver Smith, and the nature and extent of the contacts were more 
pervasive. Record at 19, 72-73. Buddensick, 972 P.2d at 929. Therefore, the ruling in 
Buddensick was not dispositive of the jurisdictional issue in the present matter. 
Third, in their memoranda regarding the Motion to Dismiss, the parties provided 
the trial court with the appropriate legal standards to apply in deciding whether general 
personal jurisdiction could be exercised over Silver Smith. The comments to Rule 3.3 of 
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the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct under the heading "Misleading Legal Argument" 
state that "[t]he underlying concept is that legal argument is a discussion seeking to 
determine the legal premises properly applicable to the case." The underlying concept or 
purpose of Rule 3.3(a)(3) was fulfilled in the present case because the legal standards 
regarding general personal jurisdiction were presented to the trial court during the 
briefing of the Motion to Dismiss. 
The Buddensick case is just one of innumerable cases from Utah and around the 
country addressing the issue of general personal jurisdiction. The Buddensick court 
surveyed the vast array of cases and distilled a set of relevant factors to consider when 
deciding whether general personal jurisdiction exists. Id. at 930-31. Both Ho and Silver 
Smith cited many cases in their respective memoranda which set forth all of the factors to 
consider. Record at 12-19, 27-41, and 42-56. All but two of the twelve factors identified 
in Buddensick opinion were considered by the trial court in deciding the Motion to 
Dismiss in the present matter.6 The following excerpt from Ho's memorandum in 
opposition to the Motion to Dismiss identified most of the relevant factors: 
Whether a non-resident defendant is doing business so as to subject it to 
jurisdiction of its courts, this court needs to determine whether the 
defendant has local offices, stores or outlets, presence of personnel, 
solicitation of business, presence of its property, real or personal, whether 
6
 The two factors not raised by the parties were (1) presence of shareholders within the 
state and (2) generation of a substantial percentage of its national sales through revenue 
generated from in-state customers. Buddensick, 972 P.2d at 930-31. Ho failed to seek 
discovery or present evidence regarding these factors. Thus, their non-inclusion in the 
argument was irrelevant. 
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these activities are sporadic or transitory as compared to continuous and 
systematic. [Citations omitted.] 
Although this defendant is not registered to run a gambling place 
within Utah, and although its principal place of business is in Wendover, it 
routinely advertises its business in Utah and solicits for patrons from Utah; 
it continuously leases real or otherwise manages personal property located 
right inside Utah to accommodate the arrivals of bus [sic] loaded passengers 
from Utah; it actively built maintains, and or uses the parking lots and 
storage facilities; it regularly buys Utah products, and hires Utah residents 
for personal services. 
Record at 32-33 (emphasis added). The following excerpt from Silver Smith's reply 
memorandum in support of the Motion to Dismiss identified additional relevant factors: 
It is undisputed by the parties that Circus Circus is not registered to do 
business in Oregon, pays no business tax here, and has no bank accounts, 
offices, real estate, employees or exclusive agents in the state. Plaintiff 
argues, however, that the activities of Circus Circus in Oregon nevertheless 
are "substantial," because Circus Circus "regularly advertises its Reno hotel 
in The Oregonian, because it distributed brochures describing that hotel to 
Smith *s Oregon travel agent, because it maintains a toll-free number for use 
of Oregon residents,.. . . 
Record at 51 (emphasis added). 
The trial court was made aware of virtually all of the factors identified in 
Buddensick, and Ho was afforded a reasonable opportunity to present her arguments 
regarding the factors. Therefore, the trial court was informed of the legal standards 
applicable to the issue of whether general personal jurisdiction existed. 
Fourth, in her Complaint, Ho alleged only that the trial court had specific personal 
jurisdiction over Silver Smith. There was no allegation in the Complaint that the court 
had general personal jurisdiction over Silver Smith. Thus, the memorandum in support of 
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the Motion to Dismiss argued that the action should be dismissed because the court 
lacked specific personal jurisdiction over Silver Smith. Because Ho alleged only specific 
personal jurisdiction, the Motion to Dismiss focused on that issue. The issue of general 
personal jurisdiction, which was the issue in Buddensick, was not the focus of the Motion 
to Dismiss, inasmuch as it had not been pleaded in the Complaint. Ho made a tenuous 
general personal jurisdiction argument in her memorandum in opposition, but still 
focused on her specific personal jurisdiction argument. Record at 27-41. 
Finally, the Utah Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Buddensick on December 
24, 1998, approximately seven months before Ho filed her Complaint to initiate the 
present lawsuit. As with all published Utah appellate decisions, the opinion was promptly 
made available to the public through both book and electronic services. Thus, there is no 
reasonable excuse for her failure to cite Buddensick if she desired to do so. This is 
particularly true in light of the fact that Ho did extensive legal research of the 
jurisdictional issue as evidenced by the 35 cases cited in her memorandum in opposition 
to the Motion to Dismiss. Indeed, given the disparity in their contacts with Utah between 
the defendant in Buddensick and the Silver Smith in this case, it is understandable that Ho 
did not rely on Buddensick in her memorandum opposing the Motion to Dismiss. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Silver Smith respectfully requests that the Court affirm 
the trial court's dismissal of Plaintiff s complaint for lack of jurisdiction. 
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